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The last few years have witnessed an important shift in international policy focus to a growing consensus that development and poverty reduction efforts cannot be disassociated from the challenges created by conflict and violence. Often in the past development actors were concerned with violent conflicts only insofar as they affected the security of states and the capacity of states to provide services, public goods and to maintain the rule of law. Less attention was paid to the individuals that lived in areas of violent conflict, beyond their immediate humanitarian needs. The collection of chapters in this volume has explored analytically and empirically how cycles of violent conflict are rooted in complex interactions between processes of violence and the behaviour, choices, aspirations, perceptions and expectations of ordinary people living in areas of armed conflict. Two common threads emerge from the range of issues discussed in this volume. The first is that cycles of violent conflict not only exert considerable influence on the lives of people affected by violence, but are also profoundly shaped by the levels of agency exercised by local populations in their daily interaction with armed actors and the organisation of violence. The second thread is related to the ways in which the use of violence (in its various forms and across time) transforms institutions and norms at the local level. These two factors provide important theoretical and empirical micro-foundations to explain the onset, duration, transformation, ending and possible renewal of violent conflict, as well as the sustainability of development processes in conflict-affected contexts.
Ordinary people matter: agency and resilience in the face of conflict
A key message of this volume is that, at a fundamental level, processes of violent conflict are closely linked to the choices, perceptions, behaviour and motivations, not only of elites and states, but also of ordinary members of society living in conflict areas. Research and policy interventions tend to focus predominantly on the victimisation aspect of violence, for obvious reasons. Much less attention has been paid to those that just get on with their lives, even under the threat and fear of violence. People living in areas of conflict and violence are more than victims: individuals, households, groups and communities suffer greatly from the effects of violence, but they also build tremendous resilience in the face of extreme forms of uncertainty.
Their choices (voluntary or involuntary) shape important dynamics of conflict and violence on the ground, and set the stage for how interventions to build peace, stability and economic prosperity in conflict-affected contexts may succeed or fail.
There are evidently important macro-level factors that explain the onset and feasibility of violent conflicts, including military, financial and technological power, ideological beliefs, mobilisation capacity, the strength of state presence, among others.
2 However, processes of violent conflict are also deeply related to what happens to people during violent conflicts, and to how they secure lives and livelihoods. Some individuals and households move away and some remain in their 4 communities despite -or sometimes because of -the outbreak of violence, carrying on with their daily lives in many cases across generations and decades of conflict. These people -a good few hundred million human beings -adapt to processes of conflict and violence in order to survive.
They adapt their livelihoods to survival needs, join in informal exchange and employment markets (sometimes legal, sometimes illegal), form strategic social and political alliances, and negotiate with armed actors. Some people succeed in ‗navigating' the conflict, others do not (Justino 2012c; Zetter and Verwimp 2011 ; see also chapter by Roger Zetter and co-authors and chapter by Tim Raeymaekers in this volume). But, overall, processes of adaptation, agency and resilience closely explain conflict outcomes and processes, including decisions about where to fight, with whom and for how long.
The strategies adopted by people in areas of conflict and violence to secure their lives and livelihoods are typically a function of two important variables (Justino 2009 (Justino 2009 ).
The interaction between material and physical forms of vulnerability may create important tradeoffs in how people adapt to violent contexts. For instance, episodes of crop burning, destruction of livestock or voluntary displacement that prevail in many conflict areas may appear on the surface to be irrational decisions from an economic survival perspective. However, these decisions may make sense when physical survival is at risk. These choices in turn have important implications for the evolution of cycles of violence, the duration of violent conflicts and the sustainability of peace and development processes in post-conflict settings.
The participation and support for armed groups is an important example of how the interplay between levels of vulnerability to violence and to poverty may influence the duration of violent conflict (Justino 2009 ). Individuals and households in conflict areas provide human and material resources, shelter and information to armed groups because this is often the only way they have of protecting themselves and their families from severe destitution, as well as from being targeted by violence (Justino 2009; Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007) , notably when state presence is weak or abusive (Goodwin 2001; Petersen 2001) . The way in which armed groups manage these relationships determines in turn how forms of collaboration or resistance (peaceful or violent) may emerge. These interactions may influence, even if partially, the 6 outbreak, recurrence and duration of warfare because they have an important bearing on the strength of armed groups and the feasibility of their strategies before, during and after the conflict.
The nature and levels of victimisation of individuals and households affected by violent conflict may also affect the sustainability of peace after the end of violent conflicts. Adverse economic and social impacts of violence may push some people into permanent forms of destitution, exclusion and discontent that may result in persistent cycles of poverty and violence (Justino 2012a ). Exclusion and disenfranchisement, particularly among ex-combatants, refugee populations and weaker factions, have been shown to affect the potential for the renewal of armed violence in post-conflict countries (Newman and Richmond 2006; Stedman 1997) , while the dynamics of violence may in contrast benefit some groups that develop interests in preserving war economies (Keen 1997) .
Recent research has suggested that although experiences of recruitment and victimisation may have adverse effects on people's welfare, these may also result in increased individual political participation and leadership once the war is over (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009 ). Charles Tilly (1975 Tilly ( , 1978 Tilly ( , 1990 An important point made in this body of literature is that violence is endogenous to how institutions emerge and are sustained. In that sense, violent conflict produces the very processes and structures that will determine the rise of inclusive or exclusive institutions once the conflict is over (Justino 2012b) . Another central point is that the nature of existing and emerging institutions in any given society will determine how (or whether) violence will be used. A large literature has highlighted the close relationship between forms of state weakness and the emergence of violent conflict (see Fearon and Laitin 2003) . While the policy literature has described these processes as a symptom of ‗state collapse' (Milliken 2003; Zartman 1995) There is also a widespread predisposition in post-conflict interventions to assume rather than test factors that underlie popular policies. Two key examples are interventions around the return of displaced populations (as discussed in the chapter in this volume by Roger Zetter and his coauthors), and the demobilisation of ex-combatants (discussed in the chapter by Yvan Guichaoua).
In the first case, policies towards refugee and displaced populations assume that the return to original sites is in most cases the best and most desired option for those that abandoned or were Second, the current approach to development policy in conflict-affected countries is to look at development processes as a way of promoting security locally, in order to hopefully avoid insecurity elsewhere (Duffield 2001 (Duffield , 2007 DFID 2011) . This objective is addressed through aid flows to particular projects that may entail potential outcomes in terms of peace and stability (DFID 2011; OECD 2011) . The research discussed in this volume suggests that the success of this global development approach is very much dependent on how the international community engages with new and emerging power structures and actors, ranging from ordinary people to non-state armed actors. These structures and actors are central to understanding why conflict may persist or transform itself, how peace may emerge, and how the survival and security of ordinary people may be supported.
There is a very large literature on international and national-level interventions to end or limit violent conflict (see Weinstein 2006 , chapter 9, for a review). However, efforts to end armed violence require not only the strengthening of state capacity or the elimination of resources available to armed groups, but also addressing how institutions and norms change locally during conflict processes. These ‗micro-foundations' are important factors in explaining the widespread phenomenon of conflict re-ignition. They are also key to the successful promotion of legitimacy of new political, economic and social institutions in cases where the conflict served to establish more inclusive and accountable forms of state-and nation-building (Justino 2009 ). In either case, development policy in conflict-affected contexts cannot disassociate itself -as it is doing nowfrom the social, economic and political institutional transformations brought about by the conflict itself. This disassociation is largely driven by the concern of development institutions about who to partner with to deliver programmes (the state), rather than a focus on what processes may deliver the best results to those in need (the people). As Severine Autesserre 
The way ahead: reflections on a new research agenda
The new micro-level perspective on the dynamics of conflict, violence and development advocated in this volume does not intend to challenge the importance of national and international policy processes in conflict-affected contexts. We fully recognise that the outbreak of violence, the emergence of new actors, and the (eventual) establishment of inclusive societies are not purely driven by local factors. The point we want to make is that neither are local processes, outcomes and dynamics entirely dependent on broader political strategies of state and non-state factions that fight for sovereignty and legitimate authority at the macro level. These micro-level factors are in fact key to the design of development policies that may break the longterm negative legacies of violent conflict, and bring about positive structural transformations.
We have, however, only started to open up the black box of institutional transformation in areas of conflict and violence. The processes whereby institutional frameworks shape the likelihood of the use of violence, or the types of institutional change promoted by different processes of armed
violence are yet to be well understood in the literature. This is an extremely important area of 19 future research, and an important challenge to us all, because these factors are at the centre of how we understand processes of transition from conflict-ridden societies to inclusive, legitimate and accountable states.
The key challenge for a future research agenda on the complex institutional dynamics linking conflict, violence and development processes is the establishment of more rigorous knowledge of how the micro-level processes of transformation discussed here may influence and be shaped by macro-level policy and political processes. While the early literature on violent conflict focussed on issues of state capacity and state security, there is a risk that the new emerging literature on micro-level conflict processes concentrates excessively on local dynamics, without much reflection on how these local processes may shape and be shaped by global and national perspectives and agendas (Kalyvas 2008 ).
We hope that this volume has gone some way to establish that the behaviour, choices and aspirations of individuals, households, groups and communities in contexts of violence often develop independently of how the conflict progresses at the national and even international levels. These forms of local dynamics may in turn have important consequences for how political negotiations progress at the national level since economic, social and political choices made locally may impact significantly on the strength and level of authority exercised by state and non-state groups, the level of support they can expect from local populations, and the ability of different actors to operate and intervene locally. However, the ways in which local populations behave, make choices and interact with local social networks and institutions are not local events 20 entirely. They depend to a large extent on how fighting and negotiations between different factions unfold in the wider political arena.
Linking micro and macro processes in conflict analysis, or in any other areas of social science research, involves considerable methodological challenges. Wider political and economic processes such as the establishment of elections, restructuring of property rights, justice and security reforms, demobilisation and reconstruction programmes, and social service provision are difficult to measure in order to precisely identify and isolate their impact at the micro-level.
Local dynamics of conflict such as individual and household exposure to violence and other aspects of people's security are also not easily observable or attributable to specific macro processes. Bringing together these two perspectives is essential as the international outlook on security becomes increasingly complex. Some progress is starting to be made in political science literature around the political micro-dynamics of civil wars (Balcells 2010; Balcells and Kalyvas 2010; Kalyvas 2006 Kalyvas , 2008 . Hopefully other social sciences and the development community in general will follow suit in order to better understand how the security and capacity of states may be closely entwined with the security and welfare of their people. This represents a considerable challenge for conflict research and the international development community alike, but one that we need to embark upon for the sake of promoting and supporting peace, justice and inclusiveness for the hundreds of millions of people locked in vicious cycles of conflict, violence and underdevelopment.
